More information : Primary Sources:
'Since the last account of the late action with the Dutch in the Hope of the 23 instant, (by some mistake said to be performed by Sir Edward Spragg, who though he had the Command of the Squadron, happened at that time to be absent) there past little action the next day, the Enemy keeping their distance, and avoiding any farther Engagement. The 24 instant, about 11 or 12 at night, the Dutch firing 12 Guns, weighed and went off, and at break of day were found to have got away as far as the Buoy of the Nore, which Sir Edward Spragg (who was now returned to his Command) perceiving, he immediately weighed, driving down with the Ebb, & about 5 came to an anchor a little below Lee; that day about 1 of the clock, being high water, the Dutch weighed again, and lay driving with their Topsails to the Mast, our Squadrons at the same time plying after them with their Top- and Fore-sails, and in an hour's time our Fireships got within shot of their greatest ships, who drove away before them: the most part of the Ebb the Dutch made all shot they could, but with little damage to Sir Edward Spragg, who kept still pursuing within shot till Sun-set, and then the Dutch came to an anchor a little below the Buoy in the Nore, and ours retiring a little above it, the two Squadrons being at about a mile and half distance, ours having a little before received an addition of 3 or 4 Fireships, and 5 Hoyes out of the Medway. In all this afternoon's service, Sir Edward gave them scarcely one Gun in answer to the great firing they made, not being able to come up so near them as he desired, the Enemy having the Wind.
'The 26th Instant about quarter ebb, the Dutch drove a mile or two farther down, about 10 of the clock Sir Joseph Jordan from Harwich with upwards of 20 sail of small Fregats, Fireships and others, was discovered standing from the Eastwards right with the Dutch, when two of his Fireships, being near them, but firing too soon, burnt down without effect, two or three more were also put by without that execution done upon them which was expected, the wind being too high for their purpose, only one Dutch ship, generally believed to be a Man of War, and supposed to have run a ground as she was standing over towards the Isle of Shepy, was seen on Fire, the men most of them saved in two boats, and brought away by a small vessel that stood over to her for this purpose. Sir Joseph Jordan having thus passed by the Enemy, came about three that Afternoon to an Anchor by Sir Edward Spragg a little above the Buoy in the Nore, when it being ebbing water, both parties kept their stations, the wind being too high for any further Engagement, till the 27th about 4 in the Afternoon, the Dutch weighed and made sail about the first quarter ebb, and were gone as far as they could be discerned from the shore, the weather being hazy; Sir Edward Spragg likewise weighing with his Squadron, plyed to the Eastwards as far as could be gained by that Tyde of ebb, which was about four miles below the Buoy in the Nore.
'Gravesend, July 28. At two Afternoon, by advice from our Fleet under Sir Edward Spragg, we have account, That this morning at 7 of the Clock, they were got as far as Blacktayle without Oazedge in pursuit of the Dutch, who were as far advanced as the Middle Grounds, and its supposed they will be got clear off the Sands by the next Tyde of Ebb, they plying to sea with all the speed they can possibly make, as fearing they may not have Water enough, the Niep Tydes coming up, and that the Wind turning Westerly, we might do execution upon them with our Fireships.' (1)
Friday 26 July 1667.
'No news at all this day what we have done to the enemy, but that the enemy is fallen down, and we after them, but to little purpose.' (2)
July 26. 4 am Sheerness. Marquis of Worcester to Lord Arlington.
'Acquainted his Highness with Capt. Shaw being sent to Allhallows. The captain was pleased to show him the Colonel's letter; has left him writing an account of what passed yesterday in their sight. Believes the enemy spent near 1,000 great shot, but with little or no execution. Sir Edw. Spragg, who followed them out of the river, hardly vouchsafed them one, they not being within the distance, and left them with the turn of the tide, and fell a little back, but the enemy did not care to follow him, though they had both wind and tide. Hopes Sir Joseph Jordan might, with this wind, do great execution with his fire-ships. Is sorry the House of Commons is too ready to discourage those that he is sure are not found unnecessary there; shall, however, keep his own men.' (8)
July 26. 8 pm. Isle of Graine. Capt. John Shaw to Lord Arlington.
'The Dutch came there this morning early. Saw some ships coming towards them; the Dutch fired at them, and immediately after several were on fire, and their whole squadron clouded with smoke of their own ordnance and that of the fire-ships, which confirmed his judgment that they were a squadron of fire-ships sent from Harwich, and put him in great hopes of the total destruction of the Dutch squadron. They appeared to be about 21 sail. Hoped that everyone would have boarded a Dutch ship, and burnt together; but when the smoke vanished, saw the Dutch still riding in their berths, and five of our fire ships burning without grappling with any, so could not observe that they burnt any of the Dutch. The rest of the 21 sail stood away to the southward, and two or three Dutch men-of-war stood in amongst them, one of which, coming on ground near Sheppey, they having no hopes of getting her off, set fire to her themselves, and she afterwards drove ashore about four miles below Sheerness. Prince Rupert was nearer to her than himself, and, without doubt, he will hear of it from him. Our ships afterwards tacked and stood about, out of shot of the Dutch, who did not weigh anchor to pursue them, so that 15 sail anchored safe by Sir Edw. Spragg's squadron. Wishes they could have had better success, as such an opportunity might have produced more honourable effects. Has sent three expresses to Earl Middleton; could not send Lord Craven duplicates for want of horses, but doubts not Sir Edw. Spragg has given him an account of this engagement. The Dutch have weighed, and are driven down seven miles below the Buoy of the Ower, but Sir Edw. Spragg is still at anchor. [2 pages.]' (9)
Saturday 27 July 1667.
'Up and to the office, where I hear that Sir John Coventry is come over from Bredah . . . This morning news is come that Sir Jos. Jordan is come from Harwich, with sixteen fire-ships and four other little ships of war: and did attempt to do some execution upon the enemy, but did it without discretion, as most do say, so as that they have been able to do no good, but have lost four of their fire ships. They attempted it seems, when the wind was too strong, that our grapplings could not hold: others say we come to leeward of them, but all condemn it as a foolish management. They are come to Sir Edward Spragg about Lee, and the Dutch are below at the Nore.' (3)
Sunday 28 July 1667.
'It rained on the 27, I having reaped the 26, a sweet shower it was. the dutch busy on our coasts, the peace said concluded.' (4)
Monday 29 July 1667.
'By and by up to the Duke of York’s chamber; and there all the talk was about Jordan’s coming with so much indiscretion, with his four little frigates and sixteen fire-ships from Harwich, to annoy the enemy. His failures were of several sorts, I know not which the truest: that he come with so strong a gale of wind, that his grapplings would not hold; that he did come by their lee; whereas if he had come athwart their hawse, they would have held; that they did not stop a tide, and come up with a windward tide, and then they would not have come so fast. Now, there happened to be Captain Jenifer by, who commanded the LILY in this business, and thus says that, finding the Dutch not so many as they expected, they did not know but that there were more of them above, and so were not so earnest to the setting upon these; that they did do what they could to make the fire-ships fall in among the enemy; and, for their lives, neither Sir J. Jordan nor others could, by shooting several times at them, make them go in; and it seems they were commanded by some idle fellows, such as they could of a sudden gather up at Harwich; which is a sad consideration that, at such a time as this, where the saving the reputation of the whole nation lay at stake, and after so long a war, the King had not credit to gather a few able men to command these vessels. He says, that if they had come up slower, the enemy would, with their boats and their great sloops, which they have to row with a great many men, they would, and did, come and cut up several of our fireships, and would certainly have taken most of them, for they do come with a great provision of these boats on purpose, and to save their men, which is bravely done of them, though they did, on this very occasion, shew great fear, as they say, by some men leaping overboard out of a great ship, as these were all of them of sixty and seventy guns a-piece, which one of our fireships laid on board, though the fire did not take. But yet it is brave to see what care they do take to encourage their men to provide great stores of boats to save them, while we have not credit to find one boat for a ship. And, further, he told us that this new way used by Deane, and this Sir W. Coventry observed several times, of preparing of fire-ships, do not do the work; for the fire, not being strong and quick enough to flame up, so as to take the rigging and sails, lies smothering a great while, half an hour before it flames, in which time they can get her off safely, though, which is uncertain, and did fail in one or two this bout, it do serve to burn our own ships. But what a shame it is to consider how two of our ships’ companies did desert their ships for fear of being taken by their boats, our little frigates being forced to leave them, being chased by their greater! And one more company did set their ship on fire, and leave her; which afterwards a Feversham fisherman come up to, and put out the fire, and carried safe into Feversham, where she now is, which was observed by the Duke of York, and all the company with him, that it was only want of courage, and a general dismay and abjectness of spirit upon all our men; and others did observe our ill management, and God Almighty’s curse upon all that we have in hand, for never such an opportunity was of destroying so many good ships of theirs as we now had. But to see how negligent we were in this business, that our fleete of Jordan’s should not have any notice where Spragg was, nor Spragg of Jordan’s, so as to be able to meet and join in the business, and help one another; but Jordan, when he saw Spragg’s fleete above, did think them to be another part of the enemy’s fleete! While, on the other side, notwithstanding our people at Court made such a secret of Jordan’s design that nobody must know it, and even this Office itself must not know it; nor for my part I did not, though Sir W. Batten says by others’ discourse to him he had heard something of it; yet De Ruyter, or he that commanded this fleete, had notice of it, and told it to a fisherman of ours that he took and released on Thursday last, which was the day before our fleete came to him. But then, that, that seems most to our disgrace, and which the Duke of York did take special and vehement notice of, is, that when the Dutch saw so many fire-ships provided for them, themselves lying, I think, about the Nore, they did with all their great ships, with a North-east wind, as I take it they said, but whatever it was, it was a wind that we should not have done it with, turn down to the Middle-ground; which the Duke of York observed, never was nor would have been undertaken by ourselves. And whereas some of the company answered, it was their great fear, not their choice that made them do it, the Duke of York answered, that it was, it may be, their fear and wisdom that made them do it; but yet their fear did not make them mistake, as we should have done, when we have had no fear upon us, and have run our ships on ground. And this brought it into my mind, that they managed their retreat down this difficult passage, with all their fear, better than we could do ourselves in the main sea, when the Duke of Albemarle run away from the Dutch, when the Prince was lost, and the Royal Charles and the other great ships come on ground upon the Galloper. Thus, in all things, in wisdom, courage, force, knowledge of our own streams, and success, the Dutch have the best of us, and do end the war with victory on their side.' (5)
29 July. 'I went to Gravesend, the Dutch fleete still at anker before the river, where I saw 5 of his Ma-tys men of war encounter above 20 of the Dutch, in the bottome of the Hope, chaceing them with many broadsides given and return'd towards the buoy of the Nore, where the body of their fleete lay, wch lasted till about midnight. One of their ships was fir'd, supposed by themselves, she being run on ground. Having seene this bold action, and their braving us so far up the river, I went home ye next day, not without indignation at our negligence, and the Nation's reproach.' (10)
Secondary Sources:
'On Thursday 25 July, when the last remaining Dutch fireship [from the attack on the Hope] ran aground and had to be burnt to save it from falling into English hands, van Nes decided to withdraw. On 26 July, when the Dutch were once more in the Thames Estuary, another small English force of frigates and fireships descended on them, this time from Harwich, under Sir Joseph Jordan. He sent a number of his fireships against the Dutch without effect, and after this the English retired to Harwich, whilst van Nes resumed his station in the King's Channel to continue the blockade of London.' (6)
'On the 26th (a year and a day after the St. James's Day Fight) van Nes's fleet was the object of an unsuccessful fireship attack directed by Jordan, who sallied from Harwich with a few frigates. The English were ignominiously chased into the Thames in what was inevitably christened the St. James's Day Flight.' (7)
Interpretation of battle and location of loss:
This action followed very shortly after the action off the Hope (1584207), in which fireships were also expended on both sides. This time it seems that the Dutch could have been, but for the wind and tide, caught in a pincer movement between the fleet already in the Thames under Sir Edward Spragg and the reinforcements from Harwich under Sir Joseph Jordan.
All sources agree that the English were unsuccessful, but the numbers of fireships expended without effect varied from Pepys' report of four (3) to Captain John Shaw's account of five (9). Five ships were named definitively as having been expended at Sheppey (ELIZABETH AND MARY, 1033771; OWNER'S ENDEAVOUR, 1033772; ST JACOB, 1033773; SWAN, 1033774; and VIRGINIA, 1033775), so would appear to correspond with Shaw's estimate. Two others were said to have been expended either on 23 July or 26 July, namely the GOLDEN HART (1248281) and MARY (1248364), one of which may be identifiable with the unidentified English ship expended on 23 July (1584245), while the other may be identifiable with the ship which was set on fire but whose fire was put out by a Faversham fisherman and taken in, according to Pepys. Evelyn (10) appears to conflate the two incidents, written retrospectively on 29 July. From his vantage point of Gravesend, and the 'bottom of the Hope' he seems to be referring to the action on 23 July (1584207), but the engagement between 5 English ships and 'above 20' of the Dutch, corresponds more closely with the action of 26 July.
There is further confusion in terms of the Dutch ship which ran aground. According to (6), she was a refugee from the previous action of 23 July, whilst primary sources (1) and (9) suggest that she was a ship particularly engaged in the 26 July action. According to (1), she ran aground while 'standing over towards the Isle of Shepy', while Pepys suggests in (9) that she grounded near Sheppey, then was set on fire by her crew and drove ashore 'four miles below Sheerness'. This suggests that she initially grounded somewhere perhaps off Minster-in-Sheppey before being lost further east, the Sheppey coastline to the north having ample mudflats in the inter-tidal zone for this to be plausible. Evelyn (10) appears to muddle the two actions of 23 and 26 July, but is clear that a Dutch ship was fired and driven ashore at some point.
The named location for this action, therefore, is interpreted as being offshore north of a point four miles east of Sheerness in Sheppey, as a particular pivotal point of the action. This point has been chosen for representational purposes only and is not to be regarded as either conclusive or definitive.
It is clear from Pepys' comments that the commanders and turn of events were the subject of public criticism, particularly in his comments on 29 July (5), and that the outcome was regarded by contemporaries as a Dutch victory. (11)
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