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Historic England Research Records

Battle Of The Downs 1639

Hob Uid: 1582748
Location :
Kent
Dover
Grid Ref : TR4338052680
Summary : The Battle of the Downs took place in the Downs anchorage on 11th October (Julian 'Old Style' Calendar then in use in England) or 21st October (Gregorian 'New Style' Calendar adopted by the Dutch and Spanish) between the Dutch and Spanish fleets under Antonio de Oquendo and Maarten Tromp respectively. It was part of the Eighty Years' War in which the Dutch sought to win independence from Spanish rule, and had been prefigured by the Battle of the Goodwin Sands in 1602 (1572890). Antonio de Oquendo was a naval commander whose father, Miguel de Oquendo, had fought with the Spanish Armada in 1588 (1583091). On this occasion, the Spanish fleet had set sail from Spain in order to relieve Dunkirk, with the Dutch determined to prevent them doing so, and at the same time to prevent the English assisting the Spanish. The Dutch comprehensively beat the Spanish, forcing a number of Spanish ships ashore under the castles on the nearby English coastline as the local inhabitants looked on, with reports coming from Dover (467778), Deal (468386), and Walmer (468409)Castles. It is unclear how many of the Spanish ships were lost, with accounts varying from 23 to 25 stranded, some of which were recovered, and others lost in action or on the Goodwin Sands: for these, please see: 1179072, 1179083, 1179087, 1329755, 1329758, 1329769, 1329772, 1329775, 1329800, 1329807, 1329812, 1329675, 1329695, 1329736, 1329738, 1329750, and 1587795. For a Portuguese vessel and a Neapolitan vessel both lost on the Spanish side, please see 1439232 and 1587801 respectively. For three Dutch fireships expended against the Spanish, please see: 1179089, 1329644, and 1587863. For six German vessels said to have been inadvertently caught up in the action, please see: 1179051, 1329509, 1329519, 1329521, 1329525, and 1329545. Sir John Pennington was unable to enforce the neutrality of the Downs anchorage, so that the outcome was a humiliation for both England and Spain, and the rise of Dutch naval power.
More information : Primary Sources:

Oct 11 1639, Dover 10am. Theophilus, Earl of Suffolk, to Sec. Windebank:

'At this instant the Spaniards and the Hollanders are in a bloody fight in the Downs. The Admiral of Holland began the fight. There are six Lubeckers already run ashore, and it is probable that more will follow. A few hours more will decide the particulars, and then you shall hear further from me.' (1)

Oct 11 1639, Dover 3pm. Theophilus, Earl of Suffolk, to Sec. Windebank:

'Since my last letter I stayed at the Downs until such time as the Spaniards and Hollanders being under sail made their way from the Downs westward, fighting as they passed. There are some ships come on shore near the castles in the Downs, and I saw two of the Spanish fleet fired close under Walmer Castle, and those are all that have yet suffered by that way. This is all that I can say touching this fight, saving that his Majesty's ships lie in the Downs safely, not having sustained, for aught I know or can be informed, any harm . . . There are many Spaniards already come ashore, for whose accommodation I have given order.' (2)

Oct 11 1639, Dover. Theophilus Earl of Suffolk to Sec. Windebank:

'Holding it part of my duty, being here, to give you all the advertisements that come to my knowledge, I am now thereby to give you to understand that since the writing of my two last letters the Hollanders which followed the Spanish fleet have possessed themselves of two of the Spanish ships which, as it seems by the relation I have, lagged behind the rest, not being able to keep sail with them, and it is the opinion of most understanding men that they are like still to take more, in this way of their falling off [from] their company. P.S.—There are already numbers of men landed both at the Downs and Dover, and more will daily come ashore. In the meantime I use my best endeavour for their accommodation, but I fear it will be burthensome to the country unless some order be taken for defraying their charges by the Spaniard.' (3)

Oct 11, 1639. Relation by Sir John Pennington, Admiral, Sir Henry Mainwaring, Henry Stradling, Richard Fielding, Edward Popham, Richard Slingsby, John Hall, William Brown, Peter White, James Bamford, William Nicholls, John Swanton, Philip Johnson, Thomas Rockwell, and John Rochester, captains and masters of the fleet for guard of the Narrow Seas, concerning the beginning of the fight in the Downs between the Spaniards and Hollanders.

'The Spaniards being berthed altogether in the best of the road, the Hollanders lying without them to the eastward and northward, and the King's ships to the southward, about eight in the morning, the wind being NW, the Hollanders were all of a sudden under sail; whereupon our admiral called a council. We were no sooner aboard with him but we heard some shot betwixt the fleets, but which began we could not certainly know by reason of the fog, but as some of our men affirm and by circumstances it is probable it was the Spaniards, yet we conceive the Hollanders gave the first occasion by weighing with their whole fleet, endeavouring to get to the windward, and coming so near that the Spaniards might justly suspect their intentions to board them with their fire ships. Our ships being all loose, we had no time to advise long, being at that time the last quarter flood. We all agreed that being the leewardmost ships of all, by reason of the fog, the thickness of the ships together, and the smoke, we could neither avoid being entangled, to a great disadvantage, betwixt the fleets, nor the danger of the fire-ships, nor yet assist the Spaniards, unless we stood to the northward to get the weather-gage of them, which we did; at which time the Holland admiral sent a captain aboard with a letter [see p. 28, No. 80], which being in Dutch we understood not, but the captain in the name of his admiral made a protestation that they had not broken the peace, but the Spaniards who began with them. The fog was so thick that the ships could not see one another, so that in an hour's time we heard few or no shots, neither were there very many shots in all. The weather clearing up a little, we could see that we had got the weather-gage of them. We stood in again with the Hollanders, and shot many guns from all our ships, shooting many of them through, but they did not return one shot at us. We continued chasing and shooting at them till they were all beyond the South Foreland, neither did they put out their flags till they were all out of the Downs and a good way off, and then seeing some Hollanders to the northward and eastward, we tacked and stood into the Downs again to prevent them from fetching [off] those Spanish ships which were run on shore, being to the number of 24, of which one was the vice-admiral, who did all willingly run on shore, save some which were forced to avoid the fire-ships which burnt out by them. In regard that the Spanish fleet was so much disabled by the loss of half their ships at the first onset and the rest flying, we did not think fit to pursue them any further, neither do we conceive that if his Majesty had at this time a force equal to the Hollanders it had been possible to prevent this action, seeing we were not to begin with them, whereby they might take their own time and best opportunity of wind and tide most for their advantage. This is a true relation, which all we captains and masters of his Majesty's fleet are ready to testify upon our oaths. As we were signing this, we made stay of two Hollanders who had run ashore in the fog between the two castles, which made many shots at them, but which the Hollanders never returned. But considering that it is probable that the Holland fleet will speedily come in again, and that we shall not be able to keep these by force if they require them, which we conceive will be a greater affront to his Majesty than what is passed, if they should take them from us, we have therefore thought it convenient at this time to dismiss them.' (4)

Oct. 11, 1639. The UNICORN, in the Downs. Sir John Pennington to [Algernon Earl of Northumberland].

'By your letter of the 8th inst. you have more clearly satisfied us all what we are to do and not to do, which if you had done before we had not given you the last trouble, though it be the very same we had concluded upon amongst ourselves before the receipt of yours, and resolved to make good to the last man. And whereas it seems my honest and plain meaning was mistaken by some, though truly construed by you, for which I thank you, for my intent, as I then wrote, was only to gain time and divert the [Hollanders] from what I was credibly informed they had concluded presently to put in execution, and to assure them that within three days there should be a certain time prefixed when they should depart or else liberty for them to take their course. If it were not so fully expressed as I intended, I beseech you to impute it to my weakness or the continual trouble I am in by a multitude of company and other business. I have sent the message you commanded me to the Holland admiral, but he has returned me no assurance that he will forbear putting his design in execution. I have also sent to the Spanish admiral, who now returns me a better answer than ever he did before, for whereas he ever formerly sent me word he was in the King's road, and therefore expected I should protect him, his answer now is that he will stick close to it if I will assist him, which we are resolved to do to the uttermost of our powers. And I conceive the Holland admiral may have received some message from their ambassador, whose son was aboard of him yesterday, for they had given [battle] on the day before, but that it fell flat calm and a great fog, but intended to do it the first opportunity, which they omitted yesterday. The 500 barrels of powder are come aboard the Spanish admiral, and he has had likewise 30 sloops more come to him from Dunkirk with men and provisions, and one taken in returning wherein were 60 Spanish soldiers. The SECOND WHELP is not yet come to us, at which I much marvel, in regard of the continual fair weather which we have, whereby they may stop and tide it from any place.' (5)

Oct. 11/21 1639, The AMELIA, in the Downs. Martin Harpenson Tromp, Admiral of the Holland Fleet, to Sir John Pennington.

'It has pleased you oftentimes to tell us by your captains, that we should have a care not to use any hostility to our enemies, for that they had order to fall upon those that should shoot first while in this road. On the 29th Sept/9th Oct. one of the Spanish ships, the sun being more than half an hour high, shot against me and my vice-admiral and other captains and officers through the foresail of our pinnace, wherein we were sailing by the Spanish fleet, trusting ourselves upon the freedom of his Majesty's road, which shot the Spaniard did not deny before you, but excused himself that it was done by night, fearing that the pinnace was a fire-ship, which you may very well know was an unjust excuse, it being our pinnace which when passing by your ship gave three pieces of ordnance. Mr. White told us that you in person gave command that our pinnace should be answered with one piece of ordnance, and at that time our officers, having been a reasonable time aboard our pinnace, came aboard our ships. You yourself can testify at what time the pinnace saluted you with three pieces, and the shot was fired against us above an hour before that salutation, whereby it appears that the Spaniards have violated his Majesty's road; besides a true report has been brought to you. What passed on the 4/14th inst. you know, when we saluting the PALSGRAVE, one of the Spaniards shot one of our men in Capt. Balke's ship dead with a musket, whereby the road was twice by them infringed; therefore we beseech you to assist us to fight [and] beat the Spaniards according to his Majesty's order. If you will not follow his order by helping us, which we trust you will, [we expect] at least that you will let us go on against our enemy and fight with him, otherwise you will give us occasion to complain to all kings and potentates of the injury done to us by you upon this our reasonable request. Hereupon certifying unto you upon our promise that we, for the reasons aforesaid and by order from our masters, are resolved here to fall upon our enemies and to defend ourselves against those that shall resist us, and had rather die as soldiers with his Majesty's leave in clearing his Majesty's road than that we should not fulfil our masters' order. Hoping that it will be acceptable to his Majesty, and if his Majesty should take any distaste we hope he will graciously forgive us.' [Copy by Sec. Windebank. Endorsed, "Translated out of the Dutch." 1¾ p.] (6)

Oct. 12, 1639, Dover. Theophilus Earl of Suffolk to Sec. Windebank.

'I know that you hear all particulars from the Downs by Sir John Pennington, what ships are fired and what run aground, wherefore of that I shall not need to write; but of that which has happened towards the west from Dover may happily by this way come best to your knowledge, and these are the particulars which I have received from Nicholas Roberts, a sea captain, whom I have employed on purpose to gain true intelligence, (viz.,) two of the Spaniards, being two leagues from Dover towards Folkestone westward, were taken by 15 sail of Hollanders, and another Spanish ship was, within a league of the same place, fired and blown up. It is further reported that five more of the Spaniards have blown up themselves, whereof it is thought the admiral is one. Of the Spaniards taken, two Holland men-of-war have brought one within three leagues of Dover, and there yet ride with her. It is verily believed by all understanding mariners that the fight is ended, and that the most part of the Spanish fleet, besides those aground in the Downs, are fired, taken, or blown up themselves. [From the cover it would appear that this letter was despatched from Dover on the 12th of October, half an hour after 9 in the morning, received at Canterbury past 1 in the afternoon, at Sittingbourne past 3 in the afternoon, Rochester almost 6 at night, Dartford past 10 at night, and received by Windebank on the 13th, in the morning. Seals with arms. ¾ p.] (7)

Oct. 12?, 1639. News letter containing a continuation of the relation of the [engagement between the] Spanish and Holland fleets.

'Since the last news there came intelligence that it was not the Spanish admiral, Don Antonio de Ocquendo, who blew up his ship, but Don Andrea de Castro, the admiral of Portugal, which may be pardoned as an easy and small mistake in the relator. This is certain, that the greater part of the Spanish fleet is ruined. The fight was performed bravely on both sides, and to understanding men seemed rather too desperately than discreetly managed. But Martin Harpenson Tromp, the Dutch admiral, a man advanced to that honour, not for noblesse of birth, but merit, whose boldness in assailing ended the controversy, himself still surviving in health and glory of his victory, and lying now at anchor in the Downs, where at his first arrival, as a salute to his Majesty's fleet, with the sea compliment of striking sail in token of acknowledgment that his Majesty was sovereign of these his seas as well as the land, he shot off 19 pieces of ordnance. Don Antonio de Ocquendo, whom the Spaniards called their general, and not admiral, is said, with four other ships, to have got under the fort at Dunkirk, for, though pursued by eight States men-of-war, having his sails filled with wind, they could not reach to board him, nor make such use of their fire ships as they might have done had he lain at anchor or in harbour. Some of the Spaniards ran ashore out of the Spanish ships which were driven aground by the Hollanders, rather expecting safety by land than sea, though in their floating houses they wanted nothing but hearts to defend them, and upon land, being bare and naked, were subject to all injuries. While I am relating the sea business, I must not forget what chanced on land; as there is some good to be got by good neighbours, so doubtless there is much evil by evil ones: as if two houses, though on sundry sides of the street, be on fire, the near dwellers cannot be secure. Deal, Notus Cæsareis locus trophæis, (as Mr. Camden has it, out of Leland's Cygnea Cantio, a town once unfortified, but now fenced with a castle, by the care and cost of Henry VIII,) stood in some danger by the shot at random which flew from the two armadas. A bullet fell into a stable and struck off a horse's head whilst eating his meat in the manger, but the loss was no more; the people were more affrighted than hurt; and had not some been more discreet, then the vulgar would have left the town for the present, and secured themselves elsewhere. And yet the strand was not secure; the shot reached thither too; and a minister, whose calling might have restrained his curiosity, riding upon the shore to see the sea fight, had his horse killed under him by a roving shot, though his person was preserved. This is all I can inform you of for the present; each hour produces more; and as this relator promises his friend, we promise the readers that upon our next certain intelligence they shall have a further and a fuller information.' [4 pp.] (8)

Oct. 13, 1639, Queen Street. Algernon Earl of Northumberland to Sir John Pennington.

'The report of the conflict between the Spaniards and the Hollanders is so various, some saying one thing, some another, that we know not what to give credit to. Capt. Hall saith, and likewise your relation, that there are 24 Spanish ships run on ground; others speak but of half that number; the captain likewise says that there were four or five ships burnt and sunk; but others that were upon the place say there was no such thing. Wherefore, for resolution of these doubts, I would have you speedily to acquaint yourself with the very truth of those accidents, and to certify the same unto me, as also what else is come to your knowledge concerning those two fleets. His Majesty, being informed that his own subjects in those parts have pillaged such Spanish ships as lie there abandoned, is much displeased at it, and commands that no person whatsoever presume to offer any injury to them, or anything therein, and that you take the best care you can to protect them with all your power, not only from the Hollanders, if any should return to molest them, but likewise from such as shall come from the shore to abuse them, of which his Majesty's pleasure you are to take especial notice, and to put the same into execution accordingly. The 10 ships are upon their way, making all the haste they can to be with you, and I doubt not but some of them will be in the Downs before these come to your hands. Their captains are all furnished with instructions to obey your commands, and you are to dispose of them as occasion shall require for his Majesty's service. [P.S. in the Earl's own handwriting.]—Divers of the Spaniards that are come ashore at Deal desire to transport themselves for Dunkirk, and to that purpose have been humble suitors to his Majesty for convoy, which his Majesty has been pleased to grant; therefore, when they come to demand convoy of you, the King's pleasure is that you give it to them. You shall very shortly hear further from me by Capt. Hall.' [2¼ pp.] (9)

Oct 13, 1639. Dover, 5pm. Theophilus Earl of Suffolk to Sec. Windebank.

'In pursuit of my former way, in giving you advertisement of the fortunes of the Spanish fleet which to themselves have unhappily fallen out, I am now again to let you know that the whole fleet of the Hollanders has returned from the chase, and now lies at this instant in Dover Road before the castle, with purpose to remove thence as the tide and wind serve. I sent one on board to learn the particulars from them of the Spaniards' defeat, and, in short, thus it is, that they are all absolutely defeated: some taken, some fired, some sunk, and the rest driven ashore upon the French coast; to conclude, the Hollanders made answer to those I sent that the whole Spanish fleet was absolutely overthrown.' (10)

Oct 11, 1639. Deal Castle. Sir John Manwood to Theophilus Earl of Suffolk. This morning I made an accord with Don Andreas de Castro, the copies whereof I send you, and, according to my engagement, I had furnished them with boats, so that the most part of his men were embarked, but the Hollanders' fleet coming in this evening, and riding at anchor before Walmer Castle, I find they get almost as fast ashore as they went aboard, so that I know not what to do more for the present but to desire you to send a speedy order to Sandwich, to send one of their companies hither to remain here upon guard till the next morning after, and that they be here by noon, as likewise that the other company may relieve them upon the same terms, and that the mayor may be here to assist me. Before these two watches are past I hope you will procure some further order from court, both for assistance and further direction, for I do not find the county too forward to assist without order from the Lord Lieutenant or his deputies. I beseech you to send me your order touching giving the Spaniards quarters, if you approve of it, for upon my conscience they have no inclination to stir from hence, neither indeed can they well.' (11) Enclosed:

11. i. Don Andreas de Castro, General of the Armada, [to Sir John Manwood.]

Promises to embark the Spanish soldiers now ashore at Dover. [Copy, in French. ½ p.] Annexed,

11. ii. Reply of Sir John Manwood, consenting to supply small boats for the purpose above mentioned. [Copy in French. ½ p.] (11)

Oct 14, 1639, Dover. Theophilus Earl of Suffolk to Sec. Windebank.

' . . . y you shall receive some private observations of my own, tending to his Majesty's service . . . I find in the people of these parts a general hatred towards the Spaniards, and by the contrary, as much good will to the Hollanders. I likewise perceive that the Spaniards are displeased, for I having some understanding of the Spanish language, and having occasion to go much up and down in my coach from place to place in this town, I hear them discourse one to another of their misfortunes, saying that it could never have happened unto them unless the English had connived and been glad of the Hollanders' victory, bursting forth into great rodomontades that the King of Spain would revenge himself upon the English and stay the merchants' ships which are in Spain. This I thought fit as a friend to acquaint you withal . . .' (12)

Oct 14, 1639, Dover. The same to the same.

' . . . this day happened an occasion, as I conceive, of some importance and trenching upon his Majesty's honour. One of the Spanish gallions was driven for his relief by the Hollanders close to the shore under the castle of Dover, whereupon I caused as many pieces to be mounted as our weak means would give me leave, both in the castle and bulwark underneath it, and presently the Spanish ship shot off a piece for help and the Hollanders presently made towards him. Then the castle shot by my command, being present, and struck a fire-ship that was coming to lay hold of the Spaniard, so that the fire-ship missed to lay hold and yet was burnt herself. The castle's shooting as often as they could kept off the Hollanders for a time, and thus we continued shooting and the Hollanders sometimes coming on and sometimes falling off all the day, until the night coming on we knew no longer at what to shoot, and they taking the advantage of the night towed the Spanish ship off and carried her away very near the shore and in the face of the King's castle, which, as I conceive, was a careless part of what interpretation might be made thereof, and out of my duty I have thought it my part to acquaint you therewith. I have caused Sir John Manwood to lie at Deal Castle, and there to take the best order he can concerning the Spaniards come on shore, and having received this letter from him [see p. 33, No. 11] . . . at Dover, where I myself am, the same inconvenience lies upon the town, and I guess the number at Dover and Deal to be about 2,000 poor and miserable people as ever I beheld, for the most part without any money at all, insomuch as the town of Dover would not have received them, if I had not passed my word to see them satisfied for their victuals and lodging.' (13)

Oct 15, 1639, Queen Street. Algernon Earl of Northumberland to Sir John Pennington.

'His Majesty finding by your letters of the 14th inst. that a great part of the Holland fleet is returned into the Downs, and having considered the answer of the Admiral of Holland given to those captains you sent to them, that he hopes the destroying of the rest of their enemies will not be displeasing to his Majesty, has thereby cause to believe they have a purpose to commit some second insolency in the like kind upon those Spanish ships now in his Majesty's road and protection, and has therefore commanded me to signify his pleasure to you that forthwith upon receipt hereof you let the said Admiral know in his Majesty's name that since he had not the patience to forbear assaulting the Spaniards for a few days, notwithstanding the assurances given by his Majesty that he would prefix a short time for the departure of both fleets out of the road, his Majesty will not suffer a second attempt to be made upon those Spanish ships now under his protection, and that for prevention thereof and of further disorders, his Majesty's pleasure is that the said Admiral, together with his whole fleet, do immediately depart out of that road, his Majesty being resolved, until he shall have received satisfaction for the insolency already committed, not to allow them the liberty of his ports or roads. And if they shall refuse to yield obedience to this his Majesty's commandment, then you shall endeavour with all the power and strength you can make to force them out of that place. But this you are not to put in execution until the ten ships that went from hence be come unto you, neither then are you to send this message to the Holland admiral, nor to discover anything whereby he may suspect your purpose till you be all fitted and ready to give on in case he refuse to conform to what his Majesty requires. You are to give convoy to such Spaniards as are now in the Downs and desire to go to Dunkirk in English vessels, which they intend to hire for their transportation. Of all which you must not fail, as you will answer the contrary at your uttermost peril.' (14)

Oct 15, 1639, Queen Street. Thomas Smith to Sir John Pennington.

'As in all other actions where there are many standers by there will be as many censurers, so in the business lately passed in the Downs your demeanour . . . hath it suffered censure and judgment of divers . . . First, that you lay not always by the broadside of the Holland admiral, whereby they say you might have prevented his weighing; but I have beaten them out of that foolish opinion. Secondly, they blame you for not riding nearer when the attempt was beginning, that so you might have been ready to have met with the Hollanders as they came near the Spaniards, and so you might have given the Spaniards courage, and then those 22 would not have run ashore. Thirdly, that when you were in the breach of the Hollanders you did not prosecute them as you might, but returned suddenly, which encouraged the enemy pursuing and disheartened the flyer. Fourthly and lastly, that you omitted to seize upon the two Hollanders that were aground and had got off and were in your power. By all these it is imagined, and would be concluded by some, that you have been partial and that you have kept secret intelligence with the Hollanders, to the betraying of the Spaniards. And one thing more they object against you, to wit, that you sent to the Spaniard, assuring him that you would never relinquish him till you sunk with him, and then left him in the open field. This is the discourse of those that love neither you nor truth, and this is fomented by the Papists and Spanish faction, who are not contented to injure you but do labour with all the might they can to cause a breach between us and Holland, a greater mischief than which there cannot be. 'Twere better the King fell out with France and Spain both. I long to have an hour's discourse with you, to tell you what rogueries there be in this little English world. But for what concerns you I am confident you will come off with honour . . .' (15)

Oct 16, 1639, Queen Street. Algernon Earl of Northumberland to Sir John Pennington.

'Yours of the 15th inst. arrived this morning. I find thereby that you are very sensible there was no more credit given to that relation sent unto me under your hand and the rest of the captains', wherein you go about to accuse the Spaniards to be the beginners of the late fight, notwithstanding all the world knows that the Hollanders had often protested to put this attempt into execution which your own letters witness. That their fleet did all first weigh, were under sail, and made towards the Spanish fleet while the Spaniards were taking in their powder, and were forced to cut or let slip and to leave the greatest part of their powder behind them. The greatest part of this being very well known to you, it did seem very strange that you went about to contradict it, and caused the truth of all the rest to be called in question. Concerning the conveying the Spaniards in English vessels for Dunkirk, I gave you directions last night, and can give you no other now, for in things of this nature I never send you any but what I receive immediately from the King. Now that the Hollanders are gone out of the Downs there will be no occasion of putting in execution those instructions I sent you last night concerning them. Howsoever, you are to keep them very secret. As for the 10 ships that are by this time with you, I believe his Majesty will suddenly recall them, it being conceived there will be no further necessity for their being out any longer at sea at this time. [By the shorthand notes in the margin and on the outside of this letter, it would appear that the gunpowder which the Spaniards were taking aboard was part of the 500 barrels supplied by connivance of the English Government. 1¾ p.] (16)

Oct 16, 1639, Queen Street. Thomas Smith to Sir John Pennington.

'You may remember that in the beginning of the late business I put you in mind to have a care of preserving the Lord Admiral's right in the Downs, in case there should any wrecks or other casualties happen there, and now my Lord has commanded me once more to refresh your memory therewith, and to tell you that he doubts not but that you very well know that the Lord Warden has no further pretension there, nor into any part of the sea than a horseman can reach with a lance. Whatsoever is further into the sea than that appertains to the Lord Admiral, and to no man else, and therefore if any man pretend to sweep for anchors or cables, or to take up any ordnance without the extent of that lance, encroaches upon my Lord Admiral's jurisdiction; and his Lordship's pleasure is that you, with the rest of the captains under you, do take order for prevention of his Lordship's prejudice in this kind and on this present occasion, and that the small vessels of the fleet which ride nearer the shore may have some particular instructions from you to this purpose. P.S.—I am extremely glad the Hollanders are gone out of the Downs . . .' (17)

In the Admiralty Court of the Cinque Ports in 1639, there were numerous cases pertaining to goods taken out of ships of the King of Spain in the Downs. An entry in DEC-1639 refers to a claim by John Norman the elder, of Deal, for expenses for the burial of many Spaniards cast on shore near Deal. He was said to have buried one hundred and three score. (5)


Pictorial Evidence:

Secondary Sources:

In 1639, a Spanish fleet carrying troops to Flanders was caught by a Dutch fleet in the Channel. After a running fight the Spanish took refuge in the Downs, where they were followed by Tromp, and where an English squadron was lying to enforce neutrality. Charles hoped to sell his protection to the highest bidder, but while he was intriguing, Tromp settled the matter by attacking and destroying the Spaniards. (4)

Interpretation of location of battle:

Sources :
Source Number : 1
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Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXX, No.66, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52880 > on 22-AUG-2014
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Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXX, No.68, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52880 > on 22-AUG-2014
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Source Number : 11
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Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXXI, No.11, 11i, 11ii, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52881 > on 26-AUG-2014
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Source Number : 12
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Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXXI, No.13, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52881 > on 26-AUG-2014
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Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXXI, No.15, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52881 > on 26-AUG-2014
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Vol(s) : XV
Source Number : 14
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Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXXI, No.18, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52881 > on 26-AUG-2014
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Source Number : 15
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Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXXI, No.20, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52881 > on 26-AUG-2014
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Source Number : 16
Source :
Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXXI, No.30, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52881 > on 26-AUG-2014
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Vol(s) : XV
Source Number : 17
Source :
Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXXI, No.31, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52881 > on 26-AUG-2014
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Vol(s) : XV
Source Number : 3
Source :
Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXX, No.70, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52880 > on 22-AUG-2014
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Vol(s) : XV
Source Number : 4
Source :
Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXX, No.74, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52880 > on 22-AUG-2014
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Vol(s) : XV
Source Number : 5
Source :
Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXX, No.77, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52880 > on 22-AUG-2014
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Vol(s) : XV
Source Number : 6
Source :
Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXX, No.80, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52880 > on 22-AUG-2014
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Vol(s) : XV
Source Number : 7
Source :
Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXXI, No.3, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52881 > on 22-AUG-2014
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Vol(s) : XV
Source Number : 8
Source :
Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXXI, No.4, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52881 > on 22-AUG-2014
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Vol(s) : XV
Source Number : 9
Source :
Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXXI, No.8, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52881 > on 22-AUG-2014
Page(s) :
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Vol(s) : XV
Source Number : 10
Source :
Source details : Charles I, 1639-40, Vol.CCCCXXI, No.9, accessed via < http://www.british-history.ac.uk/report.aspx?compid=52881 > on 26-AUG-2014
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Monument Types:
Monument Period Name : Post Medieval
Display Date : Post Medieval
Monument End Date : 1639
Monument Start Date : 1639
Monument Type : Naval Battlefield
Evidence : Documentary Evidence, Conjectural Evidence

Components and Objects:
Related Records from other datasets:
External Cross Reference Source : Admiralty Chart
External Cross Reference Number : 323 26-05-89
External Cross Reference Notes :
External Cross Reference Source : Admiralty Chart
External Cross Reference Number : 1406 16-05-69
External Cross Reference Notes :
External Cross Reference Source : Admiralty Chart
External Cross Reference Number : 1610 18-02-77
External Cross Reference Notes :
External Cross Reference Source : Admiralty Chart
External Cross Reference Number : 1828b 30-04-82
External Cross Reference Notes :
External Cross Reference Source : Admiralty Chart
External Cross Reference Number : 2449 22-08-86
External Cross Reference Notes :
External Cross Reference Source : National Monuments Record Number
External Cross Reference Number : TR 45 SW 284
External Cross Reference Notes :

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Related Activities :
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Activity type : DESK BASED ASSESSMENT
Start Date : 2012-01-01
End Date : 2013-12-31