More information : Primary Sources:
It should be noted that at the time of the battle the English still adhered to the Julian (Old Style) Calendar, whilst both their allies and their enemies had already adopted the Gregorian (New Style) Calendar. The discrepancy between the two was 10 days during the 17th century; thus the date of the battle was 30 June 1690 according to English sources, and 10 July 1690 according to Dutch and French sources.
English sources:
July 1, "Off Beachy, one in the afternoon." Lord Torrington to [Lord Carmarthen]. Describing his defeat off Beachy Head. According to the King's orders received on Sunday afternoon, we yesterday morning engaged the enemy's fleet. After two hours' fight it fell calm, which was a great misfortune especially to the Dutch, for it gave opportunities to the French to destroy all their lame ships. Most of the officers behaved well, but the Dutch to admiration. "What the consequence of this unfortunate battle may be, God Almighty only knows." [State Papers Domestic, King William's Chest, 7, No.71] (1)
'Whitehall, July 2. This morning arrived here an Express from my Lord Torrington, with an account, that he engaged the French fleet, consisting of 82 men of war on Monday about 9 in the morning off of Beachy, the Dutch squadron leading the van, and behaving themselves very bravely. The fight lasted till towards evening, when the French bore away, and came afterwards to an anchor, having received very considerable damage. The officers killed are, of the Dutch, Rear-Admiral Jan Dick, Rear-Admiral Bracker and Captain Nordel . . .' (3)
July 2/12, Whitehall. The Queen to the King. Refers to the defeat at Beachy Head . . . As for the ill success at sea, I think it has pleased God to punish them justly for they really talked as if it were impossible they should be beaten. [State Papers Domestic, King William's Chest, 7, No.72] (1)
July 15/25, Whitehall. The Queen . . . Admiral Evertzen was with me to-night and though he will not blame Lord Torrington yet he says that, unequal as the fleets were, had the English fought like the Dutch they would at least have so shattered many of the enemy's ships that they must have left the sea for their safety. [State Papers Domestic, King William's Chest, 7, No.98] (1)
Dutch Sources:
Translated, summarised and paraphrased from the original Dutch text:
A letter from Cornelis Evertsen to the States General of the Netherlands, dated from the HOLLANDIA, 'under sail between Beachy and 'Ferly' (Fairlight), the day after the battle on the 11th July (New Style), was published in the public press. He says in a postscript: 'We have the enemy now in sight, and it seems to me that they are making as if to follow us.'
He discusses the run-up to the battle and suggests that battle could more effectively have been joined by the 'Hoofden', i.e. at the mouth of the Thames off the Kentish Knock, but blames Torrington for holding stubbornly to a position off 'the western corner of Beachy Head'.
He states that on the morning of the 10th the two fleets joined battle at 8am and that the vanguard of the Allied side joined with the vanguard of the French side (the Blue Squadron), with heavy fire on both sides. Battle continued for 3 hours, in which 'we had the advantage of the French, who were holding off from us', but a calm fell around noon, preventing the Allies from pressing home their advantage, but at the same time, preventing the French from approaching.
He indicates that the fleet fell into some disorder and that he could not see the English. Fighting continued that afternoon until only 3 Dutch ships were left serviceable.
He then gives a list of the major individuals killed and that it has been decided to withdraw to the River, that is, the Thames. The French fleet is described as 82 strong. He appends a list of the ships of the Dutch fleet in each squadron. (5)
A letter from Nottingham [Daniel Finch, 2nd Earl of Nottingham] to Lord Dursley at the Hague, dated the 14th July, 1690, from Whitehall, blames Torrington for failing to support the Dutch and turning the battle into an Allied victory. He mentions that the Dutch had lost three ships, one having been taken and burnt during the battle, the other two, which could have been saved in Hastings Roads, but were burnt by their own crews so as not to fall into enemy hands. (5)
A further letter printed mentions that Captain Goes' ship was captured, and that afterwards five dismasted ships were set on fire, of which two or three [sic] were driven ashore, one was burnt by the French and two by the Dutch. (5)
French Sources:
Translated, condensed and paraphrased from the original French of Philippe le Valois, comte de Villette-Mursay:
'The year of 1690 was the "most glorious of all for the French navy, even if the victory we won in the Channel did not lead to all the results we hoped for."
'M de Tourville, as Vice-Admiral, led 75 ships which made sufficient speed to be off the Isle of Wight by 2 July New Style, while the English were still assembling at Spithead. We might have been able to surprise them but a detachment of our ships chasing some vessels sighted to the SE carried us away to our detriment.
'The two sides met the following morning and I hoped that we would join battle the same day. M de Châteaurenault commanded the blue squadron to the rear, while I was in the foremost division of the van, with M de Relingue leading in the front ship. We pressed sail to commence battle. M de Châteaurenault and I had to fall back, to our chagrin, as M de Tourville ordered us to give way to the White and Blue squadron under M le comte d'Estrées.
'We were unable to engage before night fell, which gave succour to our enemies, who were closer to the wind at SE. We followed at their heels, and stayed close in this fashion for four or five days, almost always in sight of each other. M de Tourville approved a suggestion that our battle tactics should consist of turning round towards the head or tail of the enemy, whom we perceived to wish only to join battle with the advantage of the wind. We had the advantage of numbers and so would be able to rake the enemy with fire from both sides. These orders were communicated to M de Châteaurenault but he ignored them.
'The winds were in our favour, and at dawn on the 10th July (New Style), after a fog which had lasted for three days, we found ourselves at such close quarters with the enemy that battle was inevitable. I communicated my orders to the four captains at the van of my division to press sail and keep to the wind, and I would follow them, until we had turned on the enemy's van. I should have also ordered my fireships to keep to the van of the line, then I would have been able to fire one of the enemy's capital ships.
'We took advantage of van der Putten's attack under full sail, as he fired upon me, to which I responded but little and I followed the four lead ships. Contrary to orders, M de Châteaurenault meanwhile pressed sail to follow me.
'We feared that a calm would overtake us before we could press home our advantage, so turned upon the enemy ships and eight of our lead ships poured fire into the van of the Dutch from both sides. The Dutch could not long support this volley of broadsides and fell into disorder as they fell on M de Tourville. Tourville had fought "le mylord Herbert" (Torrington) who had given way before the attack from the Soleil-Royal. The "unfortunate Dutch" were cut off and had fallen downwind, so were in a difficult position in front of our line of battle, and the English could only look on at the outcome for their allies.'
'The battle raged fiercely and in several places, and we hoped to secure a complete victory. The English had the weather gage, avoiding M de Tourville, and eventually fell upon my division, which, having turned around upon the enemy, had not kept sufficient order. I spotted a fireship bearing down upon me from the English side and made plans either to fire upon her with our cannon or for my shallop to be manned and tow her away from us. The fireship sank and we remained upwind of the Dutch. The tide bore me away from the fleet as I found myself alone, for the English had anchored under sail at the turn of the tide, and I withstood fire from 7 or 8 ships for a couple of hours, but as the tide bore me away from them, I was able to rejoin our fleet.
By this time few of the Dutch were in a condition to fight on the morrow. As night fell, M de Tourville made signal to follow the enemy which he did with his lone squadron. MM d'Estrées and de Châteaurenault failed to follow him, so that M de Tourville was unable to press home an attack.
'Even so, the enemy was greatly weakened. I was ordered the next day to follow the English to burn 9 or 10 vessels which were on the point of sinking. They set themselves on fire, one after another, as I appoached, and I rejoined M de Tourville near Rye, where he was at anchor, whence we sailed for Le Havre, having gained control of the Channel.' (2)
Order of battle showing the disposition of ships in the French fleet in the line of battle, with capital ships and their squadrons, auxiliaries behind, and behind them the fireships.
M de Tourville wrote a letter, dated 14th July (New Style), "six leagues [18 miles] off Beachy Head", in the Archives de la marine.
He summarised the battle: 'the English had the weather gage of us; I formed our line [of battle]; the Dutch were in the vanguard; Herbert [Torrington] was in the centre division and the Blue Squadron was in the rear; M de Chateaurenault was in the van of our fleet, and M d'Estrées in the rear. The Dutch attacked our van with all possible vigour; Herbert did not wish to engage with me or even with any of our ships; we held to the wind so well, that the Dutch, finding themselves having fallen out of line, could not easily regroup, and found themselves at a lost; there were a dozen of their ships completely dismasted, including among the English.'
He continued: 'A calm fell, which was the reason only one of their ships fell into our hands, which was a Dutchman of 68 guns. If only we had had our galleys, we could have captured the dismasted ships.'
The Allies anchored to keep the tide and I did the same within reach of 7 or 8 Dutchmen which were nearby. At the turn of the tide, they weighed anchor and were towed away by shallops, with shallower draught and therefore more easily manoeuvrable than ours. They gradually moved away from us to the windward while we kept in view. Two ships from the English rear division were dismasted, the remainder were dismasted by the vanguard and by our centre division. 'You cannot doubt but that after a battle of 8 hours we were at a loss, with most of our ships out of ammunition: nevertheless, we followed the Allied fleet.' (6)
M de Châteaurenault wrote an account the day after the battle, 11th July (New Style) which summarises the situation from the centre division, reproduced here. Also reproduced is a despatch from M Renau, also dated 11th July (New Style), "8 leagues [24 miles] from Beachy Head, on the coast of England". Renau's despatch describes the line of battle with a key to a plan (republished in a modern version at (7)). Essentially the Allies were seen forming a line of battle, approaching from the north-east; the French initially had difficulties forming a line since the wind was against them, but eventually did so and held to a tight line as the action moved south-westwards, while the Allied line fell into disarray in the centre. (6)
Further letters from the French commanders describe the events in the aftermath of the battle, as the French set off in pursuit of the retreating Allied fleet and various disabled Allied ships were despatched. This aftermath is discussed further below, as are the ships involved. (6)
Pictorial Sources:
This print depicts the two lines of battle engaged with one another, seen from the eastward, important features marked with numbers and letters and a printed key below in English and Dutch.
There is a location map in an inset, depicting the English bearing down on a south-westerly course upon the French, arrayed in a line bearing NNW, south of Beachy Head. This location map has a scale showing "12 English miles", and it can be seen that the centre of the English fleet is approximately 12 miles SSW of Beachy Head, the van of the French fleet being approximately the same distance SW of Beachy.
There is an element of convention in the depiction of the engagement, and thus 'artistic licence'. The two fleets are seen on a parallel course, with the English to the east. The French form a closely-serried line to the west, with a second line of widely spaced capital ships and galleys, and behind them a third line of frigates and tenders.
The three divisions of the Allied fleet are clearly seen to the east: towards the north-west the two fleets are precisely parallel, the Dutch division in the vanguard joining up with the French; the centre division, the Red squadron, has a half moon formation towards the foreground, with the rear division (Blue squadron) in a line, also in the foreground, and thus towards the southerly end of the battle.
This may represent not only the respectively greater numbers and tighter holding of the line on the French side, but also be intended to represent the English approach from easterly, with the rear squadron being the last to come up, and also represent, perhaps, Torrington's delay in holding the line of battle.
In the van behind the main Allied line, four Dutch fireships are shown, one in flames and two others sinking. (4)
Secondary Sources:
Translated and summarised from the original French:
The battle of Béveziers took place off Beachy Head and Pevensey on the 10th July 1690 (New Style). It began at 8am and lasted until 9pm. Torrington had 50 to 60 ships (sources say 53 to 62) against Châteaurenault's 75, the first time such a great number of French ships had been arrayed in line of battle. Tourville commanded the squadron opposing Torrington; Châteaurenault faced Evertsen; and d'Estrées Delaval.
French sources stated that the Anglo-Dutch retreat was "fort honorable" in the face of what has since been regarded as Louis XIV's greatest success at sea, despite the lack of the newly-built galleys which were unable to join Tourville until after the battle.
Villette-Mursay pressed sail and forced his ships to turn about the enemy, which placed them between two lines of fire. This 'enveloping' manoeuvre gradually allowed the French to surround the Dutch. (2)
The French despatched a fleet from Brest, including 68 ships of the line, in support of James II. The joint Anglo-Dutch fleet under Arthur Herbert, Earl of Torrington, was weaker, with only 56 ships of the line; Torrington retreated slowly up the Channel as Tourville advanced, but both sides acknowledged that while this weaker fleet existed an invasion from France was impossible.
While the King was away in Ireland, Mary II gave the order to fight and Torrington was forced to obey. The Dutch in the vanguard were worsted and Torrington was unable to assist. A calm fell which effectively ended the battle. The Allies lost nine ships, mainly Dutch ships so badly damaged that they were run aground and burned. (8)
Interpretation of the battle and its location:
The location of the battle is based upon its depiction in source (4), which is said to have been 'exactly drawn by a captain of a vessel in the fleet, part drawn by himself, the rest by other officers at their several stations in the engagement'. This source in eyewitness accounts suggests that the depiction of the arena of battle has a good likelihood of reasonable accuracy. The named location for the battle has therefore been taken as approximately 12 miles SSW of Beachy Head, but, given the number of vessels involved, the actual battle will have ranged for some miles, and the extent of the battle may have ranged beyond territorial waters.
This appears to be borne out by M Renau's despatch (6) dated the day after the battle and "8 leagues off Beachy Head", though the direction from Beachy is not stated. It appears from his location map of the battle that the action ranged south-westwards to some extent, the two lines of battle extending NW-SE as the English came up from the north-east.
This location can therefore only convey a notional 'mid-point' of the area of battle and is for representative purposes only, and is not intended to be definitive.
De Villette-Mursay (2) stated that he was attacked by a fireship during the battle, which then sank (1582949). This is consistent with the depiction of the sinking Allied fireships in (4). They are shown behind the Allied line, which cannot have been the case if at least one (the one attacking de Villette-Mursay) was expended. This may have been an attempt to make the depiction of their loss more visible, although they may have been held behind the principal line of battle (compare, for example, the French order of battle in (6), which in turn is consistent with the view seen in (4) of the French lines).
It seems that the ship which surrendered was probably the VRIESLAND (974985), with four fireships having been lost during the battle itself (1582949, 1582976, 1582979, and 1582981). So many Dutch ships were dismasted and disabled, noted both by Evertsen and Tourville, that it is likely there was battlefield debris (1582969). The disabled Anglo-Dutch fleet retreated towards the Thames, with the French in pursuit. It then seems that the GEKROONDE BURG was lost east of Beachy Head (1438084), in the night after the battle, followed by the NOORDERQUARTIER, which was run ashore (1583089) on the 1st/2nd, then the WAPEN VAN UTRECHT sank (1167831), possibly on the 3rd. Over the next couple of days the main body of the Anglo-Dutch fleet made their way eastwards, passing Dungeness by the 3rd/13th. There was then a group of four Dutch ships which were run ashore and burnt in the vicinity of Hastings, which seem to be identifiable with the known losses MAAGD VAN ENKHUIZEN (974986), ELSWOUT (1167835), THOLEN (1438083) and NOORD HOLLAND fireship (1438086). The COURTEEN or COURTIENE (1449034) also took part in this battle; though not wrecked on this occasion, she was wrecked some months later, on the English coast, to which her damage during the battle may have been a contributory factor. (9)
Additional sources cited in source (8):
P Aubrey, The Defeat of James II's Armada, 1692, Leicester, 1979, pp48-50;
William Laird Clowes, The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to 1900, Vol. 2, London, p336-344;
Alfred T Mahan, The Influence of Seapower on History, 1660-1783, Boston, Mass., 1890, pp182-184;
Brian Tunstall, Naval Warfare in the Age of Sail, London, 1990, pp53-4 |